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The way Simon, and the major part of the scholars, presented and used 
bounded rationality directly refers to human computational 
capabilities (or “brute-force”). Despite its broad powers of 
explanation, some problems arise when taking into account the way 
the human cognitive system really works. In order to avoid these 
problems, we present an alternative model of rationality, where 
computation plays only a part, together with the implemented role of 
external resources, emotional and other non-strictly-rational variables. 
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“[T]here is a desperate need for a more complete  
understanding of the cognitive literature  
by organizational behavior researchers.” 




Rationality, intelligence, and, broadly speaking, human cognition have always captured 
the greatest interest since Greek philosophers began inquiring into their nature.  
Far from these first thinkers, today the applied social sciences need to reach a more 
detailed understanding of human behavior: how, when and why we act. In particular, 
psychological and economic modeling tries to define human behavior through 
hypotheses on rationality. One of the most important approaches is that of bounded 
rationality, introduced by Herbert Simon.  
The model, though a very far-reaching and powerful one, defines human behavior in a 
narrow way and fails to focus on relevant cognitive resources. We attempt to enrich and 
increase complexity of the bounded rationality model in order to uncover human 
cognitive capabilities, arguing that rationality is limited, but not in the sense Simon put 
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it. 
After defining the main elements of the bounded rationality model (Section I), we try to 
outline its strengths and weaknesses (Section II and III). The last section before the 
conclusion (Section IV) is dedicated to defining our approach  to extending rationality. 
 
I. The bounded rationality model: An overview 
The concept of bounded rationality was first introduced by Herbert Simon in one of his 
first and most well-known works (1947). Since 1947 Simon himself returned to the 
point many times (see, for example, 1955; 1978; 1979; 1983) and other scholars also 
used bounded rationality (for example, see Cyert and March, 1963; Nelson and Winter, 
1973; Kahneman and Tverzky, 1982; Williamson, 1975).  
Despite the huge number of Authors grounding their works on the concept or just 
mentioning it, bounded rationality (henceforth BR) remains “little used” in its 
fundamental implications (Foss, 2003). Here, we can distinguish between analytical 
theories that improve the original model (Simon, 1955) and theories that describe 
further implications or applications of the original definition (Simon, 1947), without 
analytical, i.e. formal mathematical, references. However, most theories refer to BR as a 
powerful analytical basis, without questioning or modifying it directly (Foss, 2003; 
Conlisk, 1996). For this and other reasons, that will be addressed below, we prefer to 
refer our hypotheses directly to Simon’s approach (see also Lipman 1995, p. 43). 
As for Simon, “rationality is concerned with the selection of preferred behavior 
alternatives in terms of some system of values whereby the consequences of behavior 
can be evaluated” (Simon, 1997, p. 84). That is to say that rationality is about (1) the 
selection of alternatives through a (2) system of values that allows individuals to (3) 
behave in some way that can be submitted to (4) evaluation in its actual and potential 
consequences. Hence, rationality is concerned first with problem-solving and decision-
making activities, and then with the evaluation of results. However, the described 
process implies other necessary elements.  
“Alternative selection,” has to do with alternative searching. To express it more 
precisely, nothing can be selected if we do not look for alternatives first. Thus, the 
process of seeking alternatives is fundamental in decision-making. It is worth noting 
that alternatives are to be made, i.e. they are produced by the individual engaged in the 
decision-making process. Since alternatives are not exogenously given, we focus our 
attention on two distinct possibilities. First, if the individual accesses to all possible 
alternatives, i.e. she/he is capable of  creating  a map of actual and potential effects of 
her/his behavior, we say she/he is fully-rational. Second, if the individual cannot 
produce the overall range of alternatives, i.e. she/he has limited computational 
capabilities and/or doesn’t have full access to environmental data and variables, we say 
he/she is capable of bounded rationality only. 
The former is the economic man of the neoclassical approach describing “how people 
ought to behave, not how they do behave” (Simon, 1959, p. 254). The latter is the real 
decision-maker, essentially limited in his/her computational capabilities by internal and 
external limits. 
In other terms, to use Simon’s own definition, “rationality is bounded when it falls short 
of omniscience. And the failures of omniscience are largely failures of knowing all the 
alternatives, uncertainty about relevant exogenous events, and inability to calculate 
consequences” (Simon, 1979, p. 502). Broadly speaking, limits on rationality derive 
from natural constraints of human perception and from the fact that we are incapable of  
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computing the overall range of possible events. The first set of constraints relate to the 
environment, while the second refers directly to human rational capabilities (1955, p. 
101). 
These assumptions make management science focus on the way individuals make 
decisions and solve problems within organizations, and hence in any kind of social 
organization and group. Focusing on social organizations gave Simon a more detailed 
approach on the rationality issue. He tried to show that decision-making needs to relate 
with advancements in psychology and social psychology studies (1947; 1959). This 
aspect was underlined in order to question how relevant are, for example, role-based 
mechanisms or motivation within organizations (1959). Simon had a wide view of the 
problem, since bounds to rationality were not seen as limited to the lack of 
computational capabilities, but extended to all sorts of variables (both material and 
products-of-thought) that do limit human rational resources. 
The concept of bounded rationality can be mainly defined in relation to the neoclassical 
one. This is the way the Author did it, and this is the common way it is usually defined 
(Todd and Gigerenzer, 2003). Following this line of argument, once the result is 
obtained, it needs to be evaluated (see step 4 above). And then, if rationality is bounded, 
which kind of result do we obtain? The answer is a quick one. The hypothesis is that 
human rationality cannot map all environmental variables, create all the deriving 
alternatives, scan them, and then select the optimal option. In other words, if we are not 
able to maximize, we can only make an approximation to the optimal option. Therefore, 
individuals with bounded rationality reach satisficing results, i.e. they can only 
approximate the optimal result that is typical of the neoclassical equilibrium theories. 
Here the role of search mechanisms is crucial. Individual decision-making is based on 
seeking alternatives, and selecting them on the basis of a definite set of values. The 
metaphor Simon uses in order to explain this kind of searching is the decision tree 
(Simon, 1997; Newell and Simon, 1972), where each alternative is expressed by a 
payoff (see below). In his 1955 article, he analytically formalized this approach and 
developed it further in his works with Alan Newell on artificial intelligence (see Newell 
et al., 1958; Newell and Simon, 1972). It emerges that the idea of rationality is 
completely related to computational capabilities (March, 1978, p. 590) rather than to the 
broader cognitive system. Behavior can always be defined through algorithms, even if 
in an imperfect way, and the bounded rational woman/man compute (the acts of 
searching-evaluating-selecting) which alternative could be more appropriate.
1 
The result leads then only to the satisfacing and not to the optimal option. Following 
this approach, Simon rejects the principle of the one-best-way, introducing the concept 
of second best. This implies that solutions to problems or selection of alternatives can 
be only sub-optimal, in the real world. Moreover, we may obtain, and we normally do, 
more than one sub-optimal alternatives (or solutions) to a given situation (or problem). 
Thus, the bounded rationality model tries to take into account variety and complications 
in decision-making processes. 
                                                 
1 This is not the case of the so called “maximizing under constraints” approach to bounded rationality 
(Stigler, 1961). As Todd and Gigerenzer wrote, “[i]ntroducing real constraints does makes this approach 
more realistic, but maintaining the ideal of optimization, that is, calculating an optimal stopping point, 
does not. What is lost is psychological plausibility, because such an ideal of optimization invokes new 
kinds of omniscience, being able to foresee what additional information further search would bring, what 
it would cost, and what opportunities one would forgo during that search.” (2003, pp. 45-46). See also 
Consisk (1996) on this point.  
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The result is a serious challenge to the traditional neoclassical model that remains, it 
maybe, consistent in normative-prescriptive terms but completely fails in its descriptive-
behavioral attempts (for a clear distinction between the two aspects, see March, 1978; 
but also Frank 1988; Etzioni, 1988). 
 
II. Main implications of the BRM 
The original model has been applied in a very broad number of cases (Foss 2003; 
Conlisk 1996). The most important element from these contributions is that of 
underlying particular aspects of the general theory; although they introduce little 
improvement on the analytical side (with few exceptions, for example see Selten, 1998). 
In this section we provide  the most relevant implications of the bounded rationality 
model (BRM), as developed both in Simon’s and in other Authors’ works. In any case, 
we do not mean to review the literature, as contributions such as those of Foss or 
Conlisk greatly increase the scope. 
 
Substantive and procedural rationality 
 
Simon placed great emphasis on the distinction between substantive and procedural 
rationality (see also Munier, Selten, et al., 1999, p. 234). He described that difference 
stating that “we must give an account not only of substantive rationality – the extent to 
which appropriate courses of action are chosen – but also procedural rationality – the 
effectiveness, in light of human cognitive powers and limitations, of the procedures 
used to choose actions” (Simon, 1978, p. 9; italics in the original text). 
According to substantive rationality, the rational character of decision-making is 
concerned with the result one could get following the “appropriate” actions. Whereas 
procedural rationality points out the procedure and the process by which people make 
decisions. According to Simon, bounded rationality belongs to the latter category, 
because it does not look only at the result one could get, but at the way people make 
decisions (Simon, 1978). 
In contrast, the traditional model of rationality (i.e. the neoclassical) mixes the two 
aspects. The model is based on variable maximization (procedure), where we obtain the 
only possible appropriate behavior as a result (substantive).  
Although there are several reasons that support Simon’s claim, our contention is that it 
may turn out to be misleading. As mentioned, both the neoclassical and the bounded 
rationality model can be viewed as examples of procedural rationality. In addition, from 
this procedural perspective, differences seem to disappear. The result – the so-called 
optimum or neoclassical equilibrium – is closely connected to the way through which it 
is achieved.  
In order to make our point, we assume, as Simon does (Simon, 1947/1997, p. 121),
2 that 
rational decision-making can be described as a “tree” game in which nodes correspond 
                                                 
2 Newell and Simon were aware of the limits of the decision tree: “If we are to construct a theory of the 
subject’s thought processes, and to refer in that theory to the set of behaviors he considers, we must 
include in that set even behaviors that, though considered, prove infeasible, illegal, or in some other way 
impossible. We must, so to speak, represent the subject’s wishes and dreams as well as more realistic 
thoughts. There is no essential reason, of course, why such considerations should remain covert. […] The 
situation where the subject considers alternatives beyond those included in the game tree or other 
representation of the genuine behavior possibilities is not the only one that makes it difficult to describe 
the environment objectively. Another whole set of difficulties arises out of the fact that the subject may 
recode the situation completely” (1972: pp.60-61).  
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to positions and branches represent the alternative moves from each position. According 
to Newell et al. (1958), we assume that each move can lead to positions with known 
payoffs: (+1) meaning a win, (0) meaning a draw, and (-1) meaning a loss. 
If we define decision-making in this way, for each turn we are able to define the best 
move. Since our cognitive and computational capabilities are limited, and the 
environment often reaches high levels of complexity, we can cope only with a small 
fraction of turns. Therefore, we will never get the best position available, because we 
cannot scan and see the entire tree. The best move at a certain turn may lead us to a 
losing position, at the end. 
  
FIGURE 1 
The decision tree 
 
 
Figure 1 shows a visual example of what a decision-tree is. The best position after turn 
n. 3 is still not the best after turn n. 4. That is, in order to attain a maximizing strategy, 
we have to know all the possible consequences connected to each alternative. Simon’s 
idea of bounded rationality makes precisely this point. Since we are limited, that is, we 
cannot know everything relevant to our choice, we just make a decision that is (or may 
be) the best at a certain time. But it is not the best ever.  
The conception of optimum used in this case is clearly procedural, because it mainly 
concerns strategies, procedures, and behaviors. Here, the term “bounded” refers to the 
individual limited use of that maximizing strategy, leading to the optimum result, i.e. 
the one-best-way strategy. And then, the term “rationality” does refer to that procedure, 
i.e. to human computational abilities. This is exactly the point we are addressing: we 
may argue that Simon does not reject the neoclassical model of rationality (NCM), 
namely, the maximizing idea based on computational capabilities. He rejects the fact 
that humans can employ it in the way the neoclassical approaches put it (Newell and 





Bounded rationality and optimizing 
 
Is rationality really anything different from what was originally   thought to be? Does 
the fact that humans cannot fully employ neoclassical procedural rationality imply any 
change in terms of rationality modeling? And, if so, what would this change?  
The most likely answer is that the concept of rationality does not in fact change. 
Bounded rationality theory just points out that the result we can get is only a satisficing 
one, i.e. we get approximating solutions (Simon, 1955, p.101ff; 1979). The described 
process is merely a computational one. When we get approximating results, we are 
supposed to make computations on external and internal variables, limited by our 
perceptive system and bounded rationality. If so, rationality remains a maximizing 
procedure, namely, the “brute force” or computational procedure that humans can only 
partly employ.  
Nevertheless, bounded rationality challenges the neoclassical model, at its very basis, 
(or the SEU of Morgenstern and von Neuman, 1944). It has been, and still is, a powerful 
concept directed to opening the “brain as a black-box” hypotheses of the traditional 
economic theories. Simon opens human economic reasoning to other disciplinary 
domains, such as psychology, social psychology, computer science, cognitive science, 
politics, and so on. In other terms, it was an outstanding first step towards the search for 
a more realistic way to define human behavior. 
 
The static model 
 
We claim that the way in which bounded rationality is modeled can be thought of as 
static. We explain our point through a simple example. Imagine a large enterprise’s 
senior marketing manager deciding on the right price of the top product. She/he could 
take into consideration the common variables – such as operative costs, break even 
analysis, possible mark-ups, competitors’ prices, market prices, value added, market 
share, penetration forces, sector and general forecasts, and more – in order to fix the 
right price. In solving the problem and making the decision, she/he should cooperate 
and coordinate with his/her team/staff. Once data are gathered and the needed variables 
are defined in their trends, she/he must decide.  
Following Simon’s and not only his model, this is the point when the manager really 
starts thinking, as in the decision tree case (see below), i.e. mapping and evaluating the 
alternatives. The final price might then greatly or slightly differ in relation to the 
approach followed. In other terms, suppose the executive uses, on one side, the break-
even analysis (BEA) and, on the other, the market leader’s (ML) price as a benchmark.
3 
We have three possibilities: 1) the two prices are equally likely; 2) the BEA is higher 
than the ML price; 3) the BEA is lower than the ML price. The right alternative can be 
chosen in relation to other environmental variables, i.e. depending on corporate 
marketing policies (aggressive, follower, etc.). 
However, further problems do arise at different levels; and, for example, (a) the way 
alternatives are represented lead to different solutions (BEA can be modeled using a 
huge number of methods), (b) the mean (BEA, ML, or both) chosen can even lead to 
                                                 
3 One can think of mixing the two approaches (BEA and ML) into a third that is defined by shared 
information. We can call it the hybrid approach (HA). In this case, we have a 3x3 matrix, in which the 
first diagonal expresses the same result, i.e. when the three approaches lead to the same price. So that, we 
have seven different alternatives; but the problem doesn’t change in its logical arguments.  
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change policy, (c) the degree of motivation or responsibility the manager maintains can 
influence the aseptic decision tree procedure (these are standard arguments in the 
organizational behavior debate, and stem from its origins; see for example Maslow, 
1954 or Weick, 1969). It clearly appears that considering the last three points leads to a 
more interactive way to think about the decision-making process, i.e. bounded 
rationality has no dynamics; it is significantly a static one. 
To put it in the way that Beach and Mitchell do, we infer that bounded rationality does 
not deal with progress decisions, i.e. decisions that make progressive tests on the fitness 
of the expected results (plans) with environmental variables and actual process 
development (Beach and Mitchell, 1998, p. 14). Describing these decisions through a 
decision tree leads to a high degree of complexity that might not be so easy to manage 
and interpret. Moreover, in actual decision making and behavior, sometimes the mean-
end relation is not evident, as it ought to be in the model (Beach, 1997). 
 
 
III. Using the BRM: major constraints and problems 
The main difficulty that bounded rationality encounters is that of explaining the overall 
range of successful performances (Hanoch, 2002). In this case, the argument of bounded 
rationality is leaking.
4 While it is empirically grounded that individuals display severe 
computational limits, they actually carry out very complex tasks that do not simply 
approximate the best solution. This can be easily demonstrated using two different 
claims. 
On the one hand, following Simon’s approach, the optimum result can never be reached 
(Simon, 1979). We suggest, additionally, that the optimal result cannot even be 
envisaged. This is a relativity-based position, and we can argue that if we don’t know 
what the optimum is, why do we “approximate”? What result should we obtain if it 
cannot actually be calculated? So, successful individual behavior can be evaluated 
through many procedural methodologies, through which the computational remains the 
one related to the non-reachable and non-thinkable optimum (Silver and Mitchell, 
1990). 
On the other hand, we can come back to the emergence of creativity; it “is a form of 
decision making that requires heuristics rather than logical, comprehensive calculation” 
(Stroh, Northcraft, and Neale, 2002, p.113). How can we explain the breaking of 
computational schemes? What happens when individuals “create” a highly successful 
solution without computing at all? The history of human discoveries displays plenty of 
these amazing and highly successful results. How can the bounded rationality theory 
explain that? 
 
Procedures and results 
 
In order to illustrate our point, let us introduce an important distinction between 
procedures and results. This is a common distinction in managerial science, where 
efficiency is the measure of   the way in which results are organized, that is  the 
procedures (or processes), while effectiveness is the measure of results on the basis of 
the original goal. The first refers to means, the second to goal evaluation (Drucker, 
1973; Mintzberg, 1989; and also Simon, 1947, chapter 9). 
                                                 
4 This derives also from works by Beach and Mitchell (1998) and Beach (1997; 1998).  
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In the case of the neoclassical approach to rationality, we have “maximizing” or 
“optimizing”
5 procedures and “optimum” results (see Table 1). Let us use these terms 
without directly referring to the neoclassical tradition of thought. In the first instance, 
optimum can be considered as an end-state notion
6. That is, we do not care about how to 
get a certain result: we just look at the outcome of a decision whether it is optimum or 
not (efficacy). According to that, optimum results can be regarded as the best results 
possible (i.e. always successful), in given conditions, i.e. ceteris paribus.  
Secondly, optimum can also be considered as an outcome that is strictly defined by a 
given strategy. In this case, the term optimum refers to a procedure that is the optimizing 
strategy or brute force strategy (efficiency). Therefore, we may have an end-state 
optimum or optimum result (that we may call the best or always successful result) that 
may be independent to the optimizing strategy. To sum up: optimizing procedure is not 
equivalent to the optimum result or, likewise it can be said that procedural effectiveness 
may not coincide with the best result possible. In other terms, if we focus on results and 
on procedures independently, we might obtain different outcomes (Mintzberg, 1989). 
The case should be that of, for example, the top manager of a medium-sized enterprise 
“sensing” a great opportunity  in terms of increasing the corporate market share and 
revenues, and taking a high risk at his own responsibility, i.e. without following the 
standard internal procedure. The problem there concerned is that of reaching the 
effective result in the most efficient way. In other words, he has to re-organize costs in 
order to reach the higher market share. The internal procedure ought to differ 
significantly, being that it involves consulting human resources, marketing, product, and 
sales directors first, and starting with the usual decision-making procedure. Supposing 
that the two approaches are “perfect,” i.e. without transaction costs, the players fully-
rational, and so on, “the best,” result, in this case refers to the efficient procedure, or to 
the effective result. However, usual decisions have to deal with multiple tradeoffs and 
externalities. In a real life situation – i.e. with transaction costs, instable environmental 
conditions, and so on – these two procedures often greatly differ. In some cases, what 
we called ‘sixth-sense’ and what can equally be defined as creativity, intuition, personal 
attitude, leadership, etc., counts and leads to results that “fit” the situation. 
 
TABLE 1.  
The meanings of optimum 
 










Our main claim is that Simon simply fails, in assuming that highly successful results, or 
optimum ones, can only be obtained by a brute force strategy, as if it is the only rational 
                                                 
5 We use the terms “maximizing” and “optimizing” as synonyms, even if they are usually employed with 
slightly different meanings. In fact, maximizing is the process of reaching the maximal result, on a given 
set of variables; in this sense, it maintains a mathematic flavor. Optimizing is the best result, i.e. 
maximization of the entire spectrum of variables. While Simon refers to the first, the neoclassical Authors 
normally refer to the second. 
6 We derive the term “end-state” from (Hempel, 1958).  
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strategy. That is, Simon seems to deny the possibility of getting an optimum result 
without employing an optimizing procedure. Bounded rationality theory just states that 
the ensuing result from this strategy can only be approximating, because of human 
limits. 
  
Explaining successful outcomes 
 
Generally speaking, we may claim bounded rationality theory is fairly grounded when it 
deals with explaining human failures; but it fails in coping with other situations that do 
not necessarily involve unsuccessful outcomes or biases. Hence, the question that still 
challenges the theory of bounded rationality is: If we could get a successful (workable) 
result using a different strategy, would brute force rationality be exploited? Would we 
still be bounded in that way? 
In summary, bounded rationality is based on the following assumptions that are 
somehow misleading: 
(1) maximizing strategy is the only way to get successful results; 
(2) the notion of bounded rationality refers to the extent to which we can employ the 
brute force strategy; 
(3) the notion of satisficing concerns the results that the limited humans could get 
by employing an optimizing strategy; 
(4) humans can only partly employ this strategy because of  their limits and the 
complexity of the environment. 
We accept (3) and (4), but we reject (1) and (2). This is due to the fact that these two 
assumptions cannot allow us to explain and account for all those situations in which 
humans successfully carry out complex tasks. The distinction between maximizing 
strategy and optimum results turns out to be important for another reason we will detail 
in the following section. 
Beach and Mitchell (1998) presented a theory of decision making that is intended to 
overcome these difficulties; it is the so-called image theory. As they explain in 
summary (1998), the theory is based on “three different schematic knowledge 
structures” (p.12) that decision makers use to “organize their thinking about decisions” 
(p.12). These structures are called images, and are: (1) Value image. This first structure 
is related to general principles on which behavior (both individual and organizational) is 
based. It deals with what is behaviorally right or wrong and it is not difficult to argue 
that it relates to one’s personal moral beliefs; (2) Trajectory image. This image is related 
to the goals (p.12) one tries to achieve; it underlines that everyone, in achieving 
determined objectives (real or abstract ones), generates a personal view (vision) about 
the future possible outcomes and everyone has hopes and fears about goal achievement. 
Here, emotions seem to be called into action, but nothing is explicitly mentioned in the 
text (on this point see page 12). This trajectory image seems to be very dynamic, in the 
sense that it constantly modifies, depending on the type of goal set, and on the means 
one has to achieve it. Depending on the type of goal and of the decision (procedural or 
one-shot) the image can dramatically change; (3) Strategic image. Here the plans set to 
get the result are central; concrete actions are called tactics, while more abstract 
anticipation of future events is called forecasting (pp.12-13). This image needs the 
second to come into existence. This is the “hard core” of the theory, in the sense that it 
can be re-conducted to previous decision-making theories (Simon 1955, 1957; March 
1978; Simon and March 1956; etc.). Strategy can change with the addition of  
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information, that is to say with modifications in both environmental and internal 
(cognitive) variables.  
Despite the powerful set of analytical and empirical work around image theory, the 
arguments for “images” are still to be found. However, we refer to this theory as one of 
the best attempts to move forward from the first approaches to the topic of decision 
making, and our work intends to be a contribution, going in the same direction as image 
theory. As we will explain below, our objective is to analyze the inner core of human 
cognitive capabilities in order to provide theories of decision making with a powerful 
set of concepts that are able to frame human behavior. To this extent, our theory of 
decision making integrates (if not comprehends) image theory. 
 
The notion of heuristics 
 
In order to overcome all the difficulties related to explaining successful outcomes, 
Simon introduces a sort of ad-hoc argument. He argues that humans often employ what 
he called approximating mechanisms (Simon, 1955, p.101ff; 1979). These mechanisms, 
called heuristics, or rules of thumb, allow us to have a general picture of the problem 
one is facing. That is, they reduce the cognitive and computational demand to solve a 
problem or make a decision (Simon, 1957; Hanoch, 2002). We claim that this is 
somehow an ad-hoc explanation, because it cannot be fully integrated into the general 
model of bounded rationality. Some questions immediately come up: Is heuristics part 
of the rational process? Or is it just a trick to solve complex problems? 
 
FIGURE 2 
The decision tree revisited 
 
 
Our argument arises from the above mentioned distinction between procedures and 
results. One of the assumptions that bounded rationality theory makes is that 
computation (that is formalized through optimizing procedures) is the only way to get 
successful but satisficing results. If that is true, heuristics can only get satisficing 
results, because it approximately mirrors the optimizing procedure. It follows that the 
notion of heuristics itself cannot explain why humans may get successful results; it can 
be related to a game tree, with ex post explanations only. To make this point clearer, let 
us consider Figure 2. Here, from the initial point, the decision maker can immediately 
reach a high alternative at the fifth level, or she/he can make the first choice and then 
skip to the fourth. This is, in extreme synthesis, a scheme of what we can refer to as  
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‘heuristic’ in decision making. 
It seems that the concept of heuristics refers only to a simplification of the task one 
faces. That is, our contention is that heuristics does not change the way we cope with a 
problem: it just helps us to have a general picture. In this sense, it is something like a 
poorly detailed city map. We can see the wide main streets and the railway station, for 
instance, but not the post office, the information center, or even shops, hotels, secondary 
streets, and so on. Indeed, even a poorly detailed map can be useful in many cases, 
however, the point is that heuristics does not provide an alternative behavioral model of 
decision-making, because it essentially remains based on the tree game, that 
oversimplifies reality. In this sense, the concept of heuristics is completely coherent to 
an under-constrain – or bounded – procedure of optimization. 
However it is, the notion of heuristics that seems to introduce a radical and different 
perspective about how we make decisions and solve problems. As shown above, 
heuristics as an ad hoc argument is lacking, but it can be very useful in order to devise 
an alternative model: it can be considered as an anomaly that we must take into account 
(Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler, 1990; Camerer, 1988). The main reason to attribute 
such a role to it is that heuristics can be viewed as a facilitator. That is, it helps humans 
to manage complex tasks, and even create new valuable solutions. 
 
The role of emotions 
 
In the last part of his life, Simon placed increasing emphasis on the role played by 
various mechanisms, such as emotions, that help bounded rationality (Simon, 1983; 
Simon, 1947/1997). The argument is: humans can be partly rational because of their 
limits and the complexity of the environment. Therefore, they try to devise alternative 
paths to overcome all these constraints; that is connected to the idea of heuristics. As 
Simon put it: “emotion has particular importance because of its functions of selecting 
particular things in our environments as the focus of our attention.” (Simon, 1983: p. 
29). Although Simon acknowledges the role of emotions in setting agenda for problem 
solving, he has never tried to integrate emotions, or other various external mechanisms, 
into bounded rationality (Hanoch, 2002). In contrast, the role of emotions in decision-
making may help us to introduce the argument we will fully develop in the third section 
of this paper. 
Several authors have recently opened up new and interesting perspectives on the 
cognitive role played by emotions. Favored theories mainly fall into two general 
categories (Thagard, 2005).  
The first category considers emotions as judgments about a person’s general state 
(Oatley, 1992; Nussbaum, 2001; Scherer et al., 2001). Accordingly, an emotion, for 
instance, fear, can be viewed as a result of an inference that accounts for certain clues 
and triggers a certain response. In this sense, emotion is a summary appraisal.  
Hanoch (2002), for example, pointed out that “emotions operate with rational thinking 
in two distinct ways: (i) they restrict the range of options contemplated and evaluated; 
(ii) they focus the agent’s attention on specific parameters or aspects of the information” 
(p. 3). Emotions, rather than being a mere constraint to rationality, are also an aid to 
rationality. To be more precise, they (a) “function as an information processing 
mechanism with their own internal logic, working in conjunction with rational 
calculation, […] (b) can function as a mechanism for establishing a hierarchy of goals 
by pressing us to pursue goals that have high survival value while setting aside less  
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urgent ones” (pp. 7-8; italics added), moreover, (c) emotions also let “individuals 
imagine what can happen” (p. 13; Shackle, 1961). Finally, the important issue to be 
noted here is that we cannot understand human behavior without analyzing the role that 
emotions play in conjunction to rationality.  
Redefining Hanoch’s argument, in order to address problem solving and decision-
making more fully, emotions can be seen to play a very important role regarding four 
specific points. The first concerns paying attention: a strategy is needed that allows 
people to focus their attention on a selective set of information. The second point 
regards generating alternatives or improving those that the individual already has. The 
third is about gathering relevant facts to draw plausible inferences from them. Fourth, 
people need rules that tell them when to start searching for alternatives, but also when to 
stop. In each of these four stages emotions play a fundamental role. 
The second category considers emotions as bodily reactions. Damasio (1994 and 1999) 
pointed out that emotions are collections of chemical and neural responses that use the 
body as their theatre. According to that, emotions serve two main purposes: first, the 
production of a certain reaction; for instance, fear may induce humans to run away, if 
facing danger. Second, emotions regulate internal states of the organism so that it can be 
ready to effect a certain reaction. Increasing blood flow and breathing rhythm are 
examples of this kind (Damasio, 1999). 
Our claim is that these two views about the nature of emotions are not alternative, but 
rather complementary. As stated by the first category, we may argue that emotion is a 
kind of representation (or cognitive state) that can be considered a part of the cognitive 
process involved in decision-making. It helps humans to concentrate upon what matters, 
overcoming our limited computational resources. However, as argued in the second 
category, the cognitive relevance of emotions is not the one displayed by cold 
reasoning. In fact, emotions also involve a bodily reaction. In this sense, the 
representation we have of emotions is not something triggered within our conscious 
mind; in fact, physiological changes occur in terms of breathing rate, blood pressure, 
and so on. Accordingly, we may say that the body is the theatre of emotions (Damasio, 
1999). Hence, the question is: what kind of representation is an emotion connected to? 
What is its nature?  
Our contention is that emotion can be considered as a cognitive resource, although 
distributed across the human body. That is, the representation of an emotion is not 
(entirely) mirrored by an internal structure we can verbally or consciously access or 
induce. There are several empirical cases that support this conclusion. Let us quote a 
very interesting case-based study; that of David (Damasio and Tranel, 1993; Damasio, 
1999). Since extensive brain damage to both temporal lobes and the region of amygdala, 
David has severe limitations in learning new facts and memory. Although these 
limitations do not allow him to name or even recognize any new person, he is able to 
make sound judgments about others. What puzzles us is that he can recognize whether a 
new person is trustworthy or not, if they are good or bad; but if asked, nothing comes to 
his mind about why he made that judgment, no images, no memories. The explanation 
provided by Damasio is that David’s brain damage does not prevent emotions from 
doing their job. That is, emotions do not need any conscious state. This points to the 
conclusion that emotions are representations, that is to say, cognitive states, that are 
external, bodily rooted, and unconsciously triggered.  
Regarding emotions as external representations suggests an alternative model of 
rationality and decision-making, since the notion of cognitive resources is somehow  
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extended to domains such as that of emotion.  
 
IV. De-bounding rationality: extending the model 
The line of thought we are trying to pursue, leads us to point to a few relevant features 
of the original model of bounded rationality. In synthesis, the major claims are that 
bounded rationality (1) relies on computational capabilities only, (2) establishes a 
computational procedure to reach satisficing results, (3) doesn’t recognize the role of 
internal and external variables not directly connected to computation. These points 
make the model out to be a static one.  
In order to avoid these fallacies in understanding and describing human behavior, we 
present a model of rationality based on recent theories of distributed cognition. 
 
Internal and external resources 
 
Some of the critiques on the original bounded rationality model refer to the dichotomy 
between environmental and internal resources. Belonging to Todd and Gigerenzer 
(2003), the two spheres can be thought of as internal and external constraints to 
bounded rationality. In particular, different schools of economic thought emphasize the 
former or the latter element. Nevertheless, the two Authors insist on the fact that “there 
is another possibility regarding the bounds, external and internal, that surround our 
rationality: rather than being separate and unrelated, the two sets of bounds may be 
intimately linked” (2003, p. 144).  
This is a sort of “third approach” to the issue of limits to rationality, as posed by the 
Authors. The merger seems to confer dynamics to the original BRM, as “the internal 
bounds comprising the capacities of the cognitive system can be shaped, for instance by 
evolution or development, to take advantage of the structure of the external 
environment” (2003: p. 144). That is to say that the two “bounds” are strictly 
interconnected, as the external ones modify (or “shape,” as they put it) the internal ones. 
Thus, bounded rationality is the “positive outcome of the two types of bounds fitting 
together. In other words, humans exhibit ecological rationality – making good decisions 
with mental mechanisms whose internal structure can exploit the external information 
structures available in the environment” (2003, p. 144; italics in the text).  
Todd and Gigerenzer’s intuition is very original and is developed through a so-called 
“ecological rationality research program.” It consists in defining heuristics – i.e. the way 
individuals gather and process data related to a specific problem – that match specific 
scenarios (pp. 148ff). Selected heuristics are very simple, and the Authors’ thesis shows 
how effective behavior can also be explained by “fast and frugal” mechanisms. 
Following this framework, they find that “there are cases where cognitive limitations 
actually seem to be beneficial, enabling new functions that would be absent without 
them, rather than constraining possible behaviors of the system” (p. 160). 
This approach to rationality, while providing useful concepts and a detailed research 
program, lacks consistency in two different points. The first is related to the way the 
program is developed, that is to say “heuristics can be instantiated as a testable 
computer program” (p. 149). This element gives to the approach a sort of rigidity that 
cannot be found so often in human thinking, as argued in the paper (see, for example, 
March, 1978 on tastes; Kaufman, 1999 on arousal; Hanoch, 2002; Franck 1988 on 
emotions). Moreover, the idea of testing human decision-making processes on the 
computer is still based on the original idea of Simon, Shaw and Newell, and has been  
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heavily sustained by artificial intelligence scientists. Nevertheless, the brain-computer 
metaphor doesn’t find actual empirical evidence in recent neurological studies (Rose, 
2005; Gazzaniga, 2005). To be more precise, our hardware (neuron structures) does 
change in relation to environmental exchanges, so that our cognitive capabilities strictly 
depend on “software-hardware” interrelations and modifications. Computer 
“instantiation” misleads on the real point: cognitive and rational bounds and 
capabilities.
7 
The second point is much more relevant and useful to introduce our approach. The 
merger between the external and internal resources leads to a new model where human 
bounded rationality “filters” the external variables and shapes its boundaries. However, 
this fundamental aspect is not integrated in the research program where schemes of 
heuristics remain fixed, and rationality concerns choosing the preferred scheme in 
relation to the environmental context. Where is cognitive re-shaping located? And, what 
kind of restructuring are we facing? Moreover, what is the real impact of external 
resources on rationality? Do we “move bounds” to rationality? 
 
The distributed cognition approach and the role of external representation 
 
Recent research in cognitive science fosters the role of external resources (exogenous 
variables for economists) in understanding how human cognitive capabilities work
8. As 
a matter of fact, people constantly and heavily lean on external supports, and the quality 
of their performance would immediately drop without them (Clark and Chalmers, 
1998). Humans constantly delegate cognitive functions to the environment: 
remembering and calculating, for instance, are heavily supported by the environment 
(Norman, 1993). Very simple artifacts, such as pen and paper allow us to accomplish 
tasks that otherwise we couldn’t even think about (Donald, 2001; Magnani, 2001; 
Magnani, 2005a). And so forth.  
The point we want to make here is that all these external objects are not mere 
approximating mechanisms, but they play a crucial role in extending the rationality of 
human behavior and decision-making. Bounded rationality theory and its basis fail to 
recognize the cognitive role exhibited by external objects. More precisely, since 
bounded rationality focuses only upon what goes on within the individual mind, it fails 
to account for the fact that external computational resources extend the rational 
capabilities of humans. Thus, we may claim that rationality is un-bounded from the 
confines of the limited individual brain by the exploitation of external resources.  
In order to make this point, we shall deal with the concept of external representations 
that we briefly introduced in the last section. More precisely, we will show how external 
resources play a crucial cognitive role in extending the rational character of human 
decision-making; they encode computational resources that can be fruitfully exploited 
                                                 
7 It is worth noting that differences between the words brain, mind, intelligence, rationality, and cognition 
need a precise and in depth explanation, as they maintain strictly divergent meanings.  
8 For a general account of the distributed cognition approach, see Norman, 1993; Salmon, 1993; Hutchins, 
1995; Clark, 1997; Kirsh, 1999; Donald, 2001; Wilson, 2004.  On the role of distributed cognition in 
science, see the concept of construal (Gooding, 1994; Gooding, 2004), and that of epistemic mediator 
(Magnani, 2001). For a general account of the moral role played by external resources, see the concept of 
moral mediator (Magnani et al, 2005; Magnani 2005b, Magnani and Bardone, 2005b). For a distributed 
cognition approach on the interaction between humans and computers (HCI), see Norman, 1999; Hollan 
et al, 2000; Susi and Ziemke, 2001, Calvi and Magnani, 2002; Kirsh, 2004; Perry, 2004; Magnani and 
Bardone, 2005.  
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by humans to overcome their cognitive limits. 
Generally speaking, a problem can be defined by an initial state, a goal state, and a set 
of operators (or mediators) that allow transformation of the initial state into the goal 
state by a series of intermediate steps (Klahr and Simon, 1999).  
These intermediate steps, that we will call hereafter actions, can be grouped into two 
main categories: pragmatic and epistemic (Kirsch and Maglio, 1994). By the term 
“pragmatic actions” we refer to all those intermediate steps that alter the world to 
achieve some physical goal or other physical intermediate stages. For example, if one 
has to be refunded for a certain purchase, he has to fax the receipt. The action of faxing 
the document is a pragmatic action because it brings one closer to the goal state, 
namely, being refunded. In contrast, epistemic actions are all those actions that alter the 
representation of the task one is facing. A child that shakes and manipulates their 
birthday present to guess what there is inside is a fair example of this kind; the action of 
shaking unearths additional information that makes guessing less blind. In this case, the 
world is not strictly changed: what is changed is the representation we have about the 
problem. Accordingly, epistemic actions can also be regarded as task-transforming 
representations (Hutchins, 1995). 
That suggested above points to the conclusion that solving a problem means 
representing it so as to make the solution transparent. Hence, the question is: how can 
we make the solution of a problem more transparent? What can make the solution more 
transparent? 
We claim that the cognitive role of external resources is precisely connected with 
shaping the representation of a task so as to transform difficult tasks into ones that can 
be easily carried out. Let us make an example. Consider, for instance, the following two 
medical prescriptions (Norman, 1993): 
 
FIGURE 3 











Now, suppose we should answer the question “how many pills should I take at lunch 
time?” Here we have two different ways of representing the problem. The first is a 
traditional medical prescription that simply tells us what kind of pills we should take, 
whereas the second is a matrix. 
If we consider the two representations we immediately come up with the conclusion that 
the way the second represents the task is much easier than the first.  The reason being 
the one suggested by Simon, that is, that matrix representation makes the solution more 
transparent. The medical prescription in figure X is far more complex. Already in the 
first line we need to think about what “1 tablet 3 times a day” means. Once we came up 
with the number of pills we should take, we have to write it down. Then pass to the 
 Br  L  D  Bt 
Lanoxin      
Inderal        
Quinaglute         
Carafate         
Zantac      
Coumadin        
Inderal    -1 tablet 3 times a day 
Lanoxin    -1 tablet every a.m. 
Carafate    -1 tablet before meals and at bedtime 
Zantac    -1 tablet every 12 hours (twice a day) 
Quinaglute  -1 tablet 4 times a day 
Coumadin  -1 tablet a day  
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second line, and so forth. In contrast, the second representation is much simpler: 
answering the question simply means scanning down the lunch column “L” and 
counting the colored squares. We may even say that one gets the answer at a glance.
9 
The traditional notion of representation as a kind of abstract mental structure is 
misleading (cfr. Zhang and Norman, 1994; Gatti and Magnani, 2005; Knuutilla and 
Honkela, 2005). As the example shows, some cognitive performances can be viewed as 
the result of smart interplay between humans and the environment. The figure below 






The representation of the task we face is only partly internal. That is, when we try to 
accomplish a certain task, we exploit computational and cognitive resources embodied 
into external objects: for we are often engaged in such processes without holding an 
explicit and internal representation of them. In this case, an external representation is 
involved in terms of the actions, procedures and tacit inferences we are actually 
triggered to carry out. More generally, we may argue that external representations can 
be considered as tacit procedures that emerge from, and are prompted by, the 
interaction between humans and the environment. Therefore, internal representation 
does not mirror the entire representational task, because it is only a part of it. 
 
Broad cognitive systems 
 
In the last paragraph we pointed out how humans constantly lean on external resources 
to accomplish various tasks. We have outlined our approach relying on the notion of 
external representation. In our view, this notion plays a key role in understanding how 
external objects and symbols can enhance human capabilities. In this paragraph we shall 
detail some consequences that this approach brings about dealing with the notion of the 
cognitive system.  
That the environment plays an active role in shaping decision-making activities is based 
on the assumption that a cognitive system goes beyond the confines of the skull (Clark, 
2003). That is, the skull is not a “magic” boundary that clearly distinguishes what 
counts as cognitive and what does not (Wilson, 2004). There are several activities and 
performances that cannot be carried out only by the naked brain. External resources 
                                                 
9 On the role of representation, see also Kahneman (2003), and Tverzky and Kahneman (1978).  
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actively shape cognitive performances that cannot be taxonomized individually, say, 
only referring to what happens within the brain (Wilson, 1994). Some cognitive 
processes that we attribute only to humans are the result of smart interplay between 
humans and the environment. According to that, cognitive systems can be viewed as a 
set of packages of resources and operations (Clark and Chalmers, 1998). This set is 
open to external upgrades and changes, and most of all is distributed. Indeed, the brain 
operates on a package of basic cognitive resources, but the reason why we praise it so 
much is because of its portability (Clark and Chalmers, 1998). 
This conceptual branching leads to two main points. First of all, external resources can 
support pre-existing abilities such as memorizing or remembering. External symbols, 
that include rudimentary technologies, release humans from the limitations of the 
brain’s biological memory systems (Donald, 2001).  
Secondly, external objects can also bring into existence additional cognitive abilities 
that the naked brain could not exhibit by itself. For instance, there are several instances 
pointing to the conclusion that anthropomorphic thinking was brought about through the 
mediation of external objects that made it possible to integrate the  separate intelligence 
of  human and animal thought (Mithen, 1999; Magnani, 2005a). Upper Paleolithic cave 
paintings seemed to be fundamental aids to our ancestors in order to store information 
about animal location and behavior (Easthem & Easthem, 1991; D’Errico & Cacho, 
1987; Mithen, 1988; Mithen 1996; Lewis-Williams, 2002). They were supposed to be 
models or maps for the specific terrain around the caves so that predictions about the 
natural world were improved and decision-making facilitated. Consciousness itself, 
namely thoughts about our thoughts, can be considered as a device that may, for 
instance, enhance social abilities; we explore and use our mind and consciousness to 
predict the behavior of another (Humphrey, 1976). That is, we reflect upon how we 
would act or behave in certain contexts and then assume or infer that another individual 
will do likewise. 
The external resources approach broadens and deepens the original concept of 
rationality. Rationality is not referred to the decision-making process here while the 
result one obtains through the delegation of cognition to definite external resources is 
rational. It clearly appears then, that we do not refer merely to the computational 
capabilities but, more extensively, to the way human cognition is shaped and extended 
when getting in contact with external resources. Stating “when getting in contact to 
external resources” means in every circumstance, always; though, rationality is 
“expanded” by the way it depends on external resources and is enhanced by them.  
Let us make another example following on from Simon. Simon recognizes the “gap 
between the real environment of a decision […] and the environment as the actors 
perceive it. […] Before the advent of the personal computer, for example, it was very 
difficult for managers in business organizations to pay attention to all the major 
variables affected by their decisions. Company treasurers frequently made decisions 
about working capital with little or no attention to their impact on inventory levels, 
while production and marketing executives made decisions about inventory without 
taking into account impacts on liquidity. The introduction of computers changed the 
ways in which executives were able to reach decisions; they could now view them in 
terms of a much wider set of interrelated consequences than before. The perception of 
the environment of a decision is a function of – among other things – the information 
sources and computational capabilities of the executives who make it” (Simon, 1978, p. 
8).   
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This example is clear cut, since Simon – the other BRMs do not differ from the original 
on this point – treats environmental resources and computational capabilities as 
completely separate; the only link being perception. Therefore, the process of 
perception is the result of information, kept by human bounded rationality. This leads to 
a static relation between the information sources – the computer, in the example – and 
computational capabilities – of the executive. However, can we suppose that the 
executive changes his attitudes towards problem solving when the computer is 
introduced? Of course, we provide, as Simon does, a positive answer. But, has the 
computer-user executive enhanced her/his computational abilities in problem solving? 
Here answers begin to diverge:  for Simon, there is no way to develop computational 
capabilities through external resources, while in our view the executive modifies her/his 
cognitive attitude. In fact, she/he delegates some computational cognitive functions to 
the computer, reaching higher results than already possible. The modification impacts 
on the executive’s rationality in (1) redefining her/his way of approaching and 
representing (modeling) the problem, (2) giving the possibility to switch over variables 
other than mere computation (qualitative, relational, motivational, etc.), (3) changing 
the way itself of thinking about computation, and (4) exchanging data with the source 
(if you want a computer to give you some information, you must instruct it first!). The 
computer “changes the executive’s mind,” in a literal way. 
 
Modeling Rationality on a Distributed Basis 
 
The considerations made in the last two paragraphs might lead thinking that Simon’s 
concept of rationality is a lighter version of what it actually is. Rationality as a 
computational resource can be defined as the under-esteemed version of the whole 
range of human rational capabilities. Thus, rationality is not bounded, while 
computational capabilities maybe.
10  More precisely, “computational capabilities” (I) 
partially represent human decision-making processes, and (II) change – together with 
the other human capabilities (psychological, ethical, political, economical, etc.) – on 
their own and in relation to external resources.  
Following statement (I), we argue that rationality is not limited to computational 
capabilities, as we make decisions and obtain results also using not-entirely exploitable 
procedures. Then, following statement (II), we sustain that rationality is not bounded, 
neither in relation to the potential modifications of personal capabilities (think of the 
same individual as a child and as a Ph.D. laureate),
11 nor if we recognize the role of 
external resources (artifacts) in modifying our cognitive system.  
In summary, indeed, we do have limitations, but these are always changing (the 
cognitive system is not stable by definition) and heavily dependent on external 
resources. In this way, it is clear that our model cannot be confused with the unbounded 
rationality model of the neoclassical approach. 
 
Comparing the Three Models 
 
In order to reach a better understanding of the differences between the three models and 
                                                 
10 On this point, we completely agree with Langlois (1997) and Augier and Kreiner (2000), since what we 
claim to be limited is not rationality per se. 
11 It is not necessarily true that a Ph.D. laureate develops superior capabilities if compared to him/herself 
as a child; we are only trying todifferentiate.  
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to get a clearer picture of our model-building process, see Table 2. Here we try to 
express the main differences between the three models – neoclassical (NCM), bounded 
(BRM), and extended rationality model (ERM). In the paper, bounded rationality has 
been the starting point while the neoclassical approach remains on the background. 
Nevertheless, it is very interesting to show differences and similarities between the three 
as, in our view, bounded rationality maintains significant links to the traditional 
economic model. 
 
TABLE 2.  
The three models compared 
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We find five variables for defining the models and make them comparable: (1) the kind 
of result (or solution) attained by each model; (2) the procedure leading to that result; 
(3) the hypotheses the models put forward on the human cognitive system; then, (4) the 
cognitive capabilities one is supposed to have; and, (5) the philosophical meaning 
attributed (mostly implicitly) to the acting entity, i.e. the carrier. The variables are not 
sorted by their importance. But, they can be organized thinking of the philosophical 
hypotheses on the individual (carrier), first and on the other variables as a subsequent 
consequence of that assumption. For example, the carrier has definite cognitive 
capabilities that are related to her/his cognitive system which uses a particular procedure 
in order to obtain the result. For a better explanation of the model’s workings, it should 
be clearest to start from the first column. The major part of the issues here cited, are 
defined and criticized above. 
The three models define in various ways the results their decision-maker obtains. The 
neoclassical model refers to optimal results, i.e. the best, while through the bounded 
rationality model we obtain only sub-optimal results. The extended model suggests that 
the individual gets results that usually fit a particular situation, and are not necessarily 
linked to the optimum result. They are workable in the sense that they allow us to 
manage definite situations and can be modified (or improved) when conditions change, 
both internal and external ones. 
Our approach is based on the assumption that both the NCM and the BRM use 
computation (or brute force strategy) as the only rational goal-attainment procedure. In 
the ERM the procedure depends on the joint activity of internal and external resources, 
so that computation is only one possible procedure. Emotions, morality (in terms of  
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personal values), ideas of justice and fairness, culture, etc. have to be integrated into the 
rational model of choice between alternatives. Moreover, the meaning here attributed to 
the  exploitation of external resources is strictly linked to the cognitive meaning 
attributed. In other words, if all these elements occur in the decision-making process, it 
is clear that computation is a specific case, that cannot be considered in isolation. It can 
be prevalent or not, but it doesn’t work as both NCM and BRM suppose it does. 
In fact, the two models suppose the cognitive system to work without interrelation with 
external resources (i.e. the environment). In the first case (NCM), the system works in 
complete isolation; in the second case (BRM) the environment is a source of constraint 
to the “natural” and “static” human brain. So that, in the latter case, modifications do 
occur, but it is very similar to an input-output scheme. The extended model, on the 
contrary, is based on the distributed cognitive system, in the sense that external 
resources define our system and the way it works. 
The main point here is that of limits to individuals’ cognitive capabilities. The NCM 
hypothesis is that of individuals having no limits, we say they are unbounded (Shakun, 
2001). On the contrary, BRM computational capabilities, as the only procedure to 
obtain results, are limited in individuals. In our approach, these rational bounds do exist 
as observed in actual human behavior; however, they are related (a) to the use and 
meanings of external resources, as (b) to the general social environment in which the 
individual behaves, and (c) to time-effect on this interaction (also reflected on means-
end modifications). The individual here considered is clearly a god-like creature, for the 
NCM, while it is human for the other two. It is clear if we consider the normative flavor 
of the first and the behavioral intent of the other two. 
 
V. Conclusion: Challenges and future developments  
During the paper we used the term “rationality” with a particular meaning that is 
broader than that of computational capability. We never refer to cognitive capabilities 
using the word “intelligence.” As Heims (1970) put it, intelligence can be defined as 
“the ability to grasp the essentials of situation and respond appropriately,” and 
Humphrey (1976) suggests to “substitute ‘adaptively’ for ‘appropriately’ and the 
problem of the biological function of intellect is (tautologically) solved” (p. 304). The 
point is that problem solving is essential for every kind of animal, so that we cannot use 
the term without further specifications.  
Defining intelligence is a very difficult task, however Humphrey thinks that “the 
following formula provides at least some kind of anchor: ‘An animal displays 
intelligence when he modifies his behavior on the basis of valid inference from 
evidence.’ The word valid is meant to imply only that the inference is logically sound” 
(1976: p. 304). Using the same scheme he uses for Heims’ definition: substitute 
‘rational’ for ‘intelligence’ and you find the meaning we give to “rationality.” 
Therefore, in order to avoid confusion, we recommend using rationality for human 
cognitive abilities, reflected both in behavior and thinking while intelligence is strictly 
connected to the self-consciousness that the individual has of her/his rationality. In this 
way we differ from the common use of the two terms and from the overlap of their 
meanings. Furthermore, we can say that animals are rational but, that strictly speaking, 
only humans can be intelligent. 
The bounded rationality model, thus a very effective approach to analyze human 
decision-making, defines rationality as computational activity, emphasizing the use of 
brute force in problem solving. Therefore, it fails to recognize important variables such  
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as the real impact of external resources, and the role emotions, morality, etc. do play in 
affecting the human cognitive system. 
As we tried to show, recent cognitive studies underline that the way our mind operates 
is very different from what is supposed by that simple model. Instead of definition 
based on negative assumptions – those of bounded rationality, in the way it is based on 
a sort of neoclassical denial – we have to find out the positive attributes of human 
rationality. 
We suggest using a broader approach to rationality, defined as the ability to make use of 
the human cognitive system. This is referred to the greater part of our cerebral activity, 
and it is not limited to decision making. However, most of this activity can be referred 
to as decision making and problem solving. This is the very reason why Simon’s 
approach reached a broad impact in a huge number of different disciplinary domains. 
Our cognitive system is distributed, in the sense that individuals cannot think or act 
rationally without the help of external resources, to which a sort of cognitive meaning is 
conferred. Thinking of human cognitive capability without implementing the role of 
external resources in its interactive processes, leads to a basic oversimplification of it. 
External resources can be materials, objects, and all kind of things (artifacts, in a 
technical meaning), but also, and primarily, other individuals. It is clear, then, that 
social, cultural, moral, political, and other variables referred to individual interactions 
must be included in the new model of rational choice. 
In brief, the extended model defines rationality in a broad sense, including external 
variables into the human cognitive system, where bounds still remain in the actual 
process, but not in the potential exploitation of human resources. 
The analysis of the model of rationality can take a number of roots. However, we are 
focusing the research on few but crucial elements. 
First, we are studying the effect of the theory of distributed cognition on the process of 
decision-making. This research is of significant interest for economics, but it is 
developed on the basis of a broader approach, i.e. referring to other scientific domains 
such as psychology, sociology, and political science.  
Secondly, we think that the most important contribution of the approach will be that of 
analyzing its impact in the organizational context. As Simon did with his model of 
bounded rationality, we are going to analyze the impact that the model has on 
motivation, creativity, leadership, staff-line relationships, etc. within the framework of 
organizational behavior studies. Moreover, the model should help in understanding 
decision-making processes, and provide us with new insights. Organizations are limited 
contexts where variables can be analyzed in greater depth way, so studies in this 
direction should lead to significant contributions. Last, but not least, our research 
program is devoted to empirical testing of the model. This part is not clearly separated 
from the other two, but serves to sustaining or even denying them. Both the study of 
decision-making in general and as it applies to organizations needs to be supported by 
data, in order to reach ever clearer and more useful models to enhance our 
understanding of human cognitive capabilities. 
Finally, we started from the assumption that modern social sciences, and especially 
economics and management, need to be strongly rooted in actual behavior. The model 
of rationality based on the distributed cognition approach is basically an attempt to go 
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